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INTRODUCTION
Trust and Hope
 Esther Oluffa Pedersen and Sune Liisberg
Trusting and hoping alike are conjectural modes of understanding. They relate to the practical identity of human beings as persons. 
Who can I trust? What may I hope? Although both trust and hope 
are related to factual understandings of past experiences, they equally 
imply a move toward the future that depends on the imaginary antic-
ipation of the imminent. They concern future states that exceed the 
immediate control of the person trusting or hoping. But whereas trust 
typically concerns near and probable futures that mostly meet our ex-
pectations, hope may very well paint a scenario of a possible and radi-
cally different future. Hope in the radically new is a mode of existence 
that can persist without trust in its realization. But if I hope for events 
and phenomena that lie closer to my immediate life-world, my hope 
seems to be backed up by some kind of trust in these things being pos-
sible to realize. Trusting someone or something implies that I also hope 
for the realization of the trusted. My hope, however, can be completely 
convoluted and implicit in trust in a way that makes a re-description of 
trust in terms of hope misleading. In this sense, trusting is a mode of 
existence that shapes our outlook on the near future; a future that will 
probably develop according to implicitly or explicitly expressed expec-
tations. Hope, conversely, is a perspective toward a future that I wish 
were possible, but about which I may also have a troublesome feeling 
that it may not be realized. This difference in the subjunctive space 
taken up by trust and hope, respectively, is important and constitutes 
the basis for a difference in the approaches taken when researching 
trust and hope.
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There is a signifi cant and increasing interest in studying trust, 
whereas hope as a research topic is not favored with the same atten-
tion. A prevalent approach to studying trust in the social sciences is 
to perform quantitative survey studies of generalized trust in different 
entities, ranging from trust in political institutions, over trust in the 
economy, to trust in other individuals. On the background of large-
scale, quantitative survey studies into trust, social scientists talk about 
low-trust and high-trust nations and communities. Such measurements 
of trust are common, and the results are often mentioned in the public 
debate. But when it comes to hope, we do not fi nd a similar level of 
attention. There are examples of quantitative measurements of hope, 
but they are rare. The difference surely has something to do with the 
fact that while high/low degrees of trust indicate traits about the gen-
eral behavior of the members of a given group, this would not be as 
apparent with measurements of hope. There seems to be a fairly robust 
correlation between measuring high degrees of trust in a population 
and high levels of social collaboration. Similar correlations between 
hope and behavior are much looser—if, indeed, they can be tracked at 
all. Basically, hope does not lend itself as easily to quantitative mea-
surement as trust does.
In the context of this book there will be little focus on quantita-
tive approaches to the study of trust and hope. In its place the reader 
will fi nd conceptual and qualitative analyses of trust and hope, viewed 
from within a specifi c context and as a phenomenon pertaining to the 
fi rst-person perspective, which takes a central position in the chapters 
that make up this volume. The common foundation for all of the chap-
ters is the double approach of, fi rstly, developing a mode of collabora-
tion between anthropology and philosophy and, secondly, analyzing 
either trust or hope from the viewpoint of the association between the 
specifi c anthropologist and philosopher. Accordingly, all chapters are 
the result of collaboration between an anthropologist and a philosopher, 
who have discussed a common angle and a shared interest in trust and 
hope. Some of the contributing anthropologists and philosophers take 
their point of departure in developing or sustaining a distinctive theo-
retical understanding of trust and hope. Others seek to understand a 
specifi c cultural context through the perspective of either trust or hope, 
while yet others engage in developing empirical and conceptual bridges 
between trust and hope.
The participating anthropologists and philosophers, working in pairs, 
have discussed and developed their specialized academic research angles, 
focusing their encounters on a shared topic. In so doing, this anthology 
goes against the current, that is, it counteracts the scarcity of direct di-
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alogue between the two disciplines. Presupposing and aiming to show 
that a huge potential exists and can be uncovered by jointly exploring 
these topics, the anthology seeks to pave the way for further collabo-
rative efforts by bringing anthropologists and philosophers together in 
the shared exploration of trust and hope. The underlying premise of the 
book is that the phenomena of trust and hope can best be examined 
and analyzed when standing upon a strong empirical foundation and 
reaching outward to perform an equally strong conceptual exploration. 
The dialogues collected in this anthology seek to substantially develop 
the current understanding of trust and hope in anthropological and 
philosophical research. We hope that the different models of coopera-
tion between anthropologists and philosophers represented here may 
inspire other anthropologists and philosophers to engage in interdisci-
plinary projects, discussions, and work. In this sense, we consider the 
very format of the book to be paradigmatic and encouraging for new 
possibilities of interdisciplinary research into the human condition.
The Context for Bringing Anthropologists 
and Philosophers into Dialogue
The conception of this anthology dates back to 2009, a period of time at 
Aarhus University where anthropologists and philosophers from Den-
mark and the United States had the opportunity to do interdisciplin-
ary work and exchange their views. Anthropologists and philosophers 
alike experienced their exchange of ideas as being so productive that it 
was suggested that we should build on this creative moment to shape 
something more enduring. Thus, the idea behind the anthology was 
born. Contributors were soon invited, and work began. As with most 
anthologies, the process of actualizing the content has, at times, been 
challenging. Some of these challenges were purely practical, while oth-
ers had to do with the form that we had chosen for the book: The 
contributions should, in one form or another, be a dialogue between 
an anthropologist and a philosopher. We had no recipe for this kind of 
partnership, so every pair of contributors had to fi nd their own way of 
doing it. We have found these challenges worthwhile and valuable be-
cause the results of the encounters between representatives of anthro-
pology and philosophy demonstrate how both disciplines can benefi t 
from such interdisciplinary work.
Within a Danish context, trust and hope have a prominent history 
as privileged topics of research. It is almost impossible to discuss trust 
without mentioning the Danish philosopher and theologian Knud Ejler 
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Løgstrup (1905–1981), a former professor at Aarhus University. His 
book The Ethical Demand (Løgstrup [1956] 1997), has had a lasting 
signifi cance for the understanding and discussion of the phenomenon 
of trust. According to Løgstrup, trust is naturally given. Our imme-
diate and unbiased reaction to another human being is characterized 
by trust. Trust is thus the original moral sentiment that forms human 
encounters. Only subsequently do we pass judgment on one another, 
and only subsequently are we in need of moral principles to guide our 
actions. Løgstrup argues that the human life-world is permeated with 
the silent, radical, and unarticulated ethical demand that we take care 
of the exposed, vulnerable life placed into our hands by another person, 
“the other.” Building on this premise, Løgstrup launches a critique not 
only of traditional moral theories such as Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) 
conception of the categorical imperative based on reason to guide and 
motivate moral actions, or utilitarianism’s conception of morality as the 
principle of the greatest happiness, but also what Løgstrup (1968) re-
fers to as the “subjectivism” of the Danish philosopher and theologian 
Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855).
Løgstrup fi nds that Kierkegaard has misrepresented not only the re-
lations between human beings, but also the human relation to the world 
and God. We are, according to Løgstrup, placed in a shared life-world, 
which is imbued with the responsibility to safeguard the fragility of life. 
Løgstrup focuses on the permeating goodness of Creation, arguing that 
we are all placed in this world with a mutual responsibility to sustain it. 
For his part, Kierkegaard understood human life as radically individual, 
in that a true relation to God is characterized by passion and can be 
established only from the point of view of subjectivity. Where Løgstrup 
concentrates on trust as a phenomenon closely related to everyday life, 
Kierkegaard examines the everyday despair of the human being. In 
Kierkegaard’s view, despair is only dissolvable by the Christian pos-
sibility of faith. A key assumption in Kierkegaard is therefore the as-
sertion that life would be nothing but despair, were there no eternal 
consciousness (Kierkegaard [1843] 1983), and this assertion is import-
ant to Kierkegaard’s notion of futurity and the possibility of hope.
In his famous analysis of anxiety from 1843, Kierkegaard (1992) 
defi nes anxiety as a dizzy experience of freedom that confronts us with 
possibility as such, and possibility is linked with futurity, since having 
existential possibility is defi ning for having a future. In this radical ex-
perience of freedom, the human being is confronted with the idea of 
God as representing a person’s possibility of being forgiven and, at the 
same time, as the limit of reason to which the human subject can relate 
only in faith. According to Kierkegaard ([1843] 1990), faith is concerned 
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with eternity in the form of being an expectation of victory. However, 
the victory of faith simply consists in having the expectation now, in 
this concrete life—existentially it does not concern a victory in another, 
distant life. Faith, being the expectation of victory, in this way entails 
hope as a modus of human life as well. So, in Kierkegaard, one could 
say that from the depths of anxiety and despair we are thrown back 
into the life that we have before us, our own life, but in a qualitatively 
different way, namely as something that is subjected to a choice, and 
which can exclusively be realized authentically as chosen. Only against 
this background—and this would be the existentialist argument against 
Løgstrup—can trust and hope as everyday features of the human social 
world qualify as features of what we have chosen more fundamentally, 
namely our life.
In the present volume, several contributors, American and Danish, 
critically discuss Løgstrup’s theory of trust. Kierkegaard, among other 
existentialist and existential-political thinkers, is also addressed here 
by some as a central thinker, especially with regard to the theme of 
hope. From another angle, namely the French sociological tradition, 
comes a fi gure that is central for a number of contributors: the anthro-
pologist Marcel Mauss. His widely acknowledged book The Gift from 
1925 (Mauss 2010) seems to capture a very essential feature of trust 
relations: the structure of gift exchange. The exchange of gifts is what 
Mauss has called “a total social phenomenon,” meaning that it lies at 
the root of, and is implied in, every social enterprise and comes across 
as a more basic structure of sociality than the homo oeconomicus of our 
days; and so it is that Mauss suggests that we should take as a principal 
aspect of our life what has been, and always will be, the principle: Go 
beyond yourself, donate, freely and obligatorily; one has nothing there 
to risk (see Mauss [1925] 2010). In its capacity of being a total social 
phenomenon, the structure of gift exchange might as well be identifi ed 
as lying at the root of inter-human trust relations. One could say that 
when people trust one another, we actually exchange a piece of our 
freedom with the other person.
The above-mentioned authors do not exhaust the theoretical sources 
of inspiration for investigations of trust and hope in the area where an-
thropology and philosophy intersect. The dialogues presented in this 
anthology are a vivid illustration of this. Nevertheless, by pointing to a 
discrepancy between Løgstrup’s propensity to hold an affi rmative and 
optimistic worldview, on the one hand, and Kierkegaard’s more gloomy 
and individualistic stance to the world, on the other hand, we can in-
dicate a larger question concerning how to approach the phenomena 
of trust and hope that needs to be dealt with in one way or another. 
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That question is: Will we take as our starting point an affi rmation of 
the actuality and relevance of trust and hope, or will we commence 
to question what trust and hope may be within the modern world? 
The dialogues in this volume present different answers. The theoreti-
cal framework of gift-giving elaborated on by Mauss offers a possible 
way to obviate the choice itself (between a tendency to hold generally 
optimistic or pessimistic views concerning the instantiation of investi-
gations into trust and hope) by focusing on the structure of giving and 
receiving gifts. The French tradition of Mauss thereby gives primacy to 
an analysis of the structure, preferring it over an investigation into the 
individual perspective. As regards a discussion of agent versus struc-
ture, the dialogues in this volume once again present a variety of differ-
ent takes on how to tackle such methodological issues.
The Results of the Meetings Between Anthropologists 
and Philosophers in Their Writing
Commencing on a joint endeavor between anthropologists and philos-
ophers is only possible when the partners from the two disciplines are 
open toward the way questions are asked and answers are sought by the 
anthropologist and the philosopher respectively. Thus the discussion of 
possibilities of collaboration should not be conducted on a too abstract 
level. It needs to be grounded in either an approach to practicing an-
thropological and philosophical analysis or in a specifi c topic. The seven 
pairs presented here can be said to develop seven distinct approaches 
to the joint venture of anthropologists and philosophers. The different 
modes of collaboration will hopefully be interesting for others to read 
both because of their different ways of handling the interdisciplinary 
work and because of the analyses that arise out of the experiment.
The opening dialogue, Practical Philosophy and Hope as a Moral 
Project among African-Americans, between anthropologist Cheryl Mat-
tingly and philosopher Uffe Juul Jensen, refl ects upon the relations be-
tween anthropology and philosophy. It argues for the rewards of this 
encounter, and shows how a fruitful encounter can take place by elabo-
rating on the fi eldwork done by Mattingly. They have approvingly taken 
on the recommendation of interdisciplinary work between anthropolo-
gists and philosophers and have composed a jointly authored chapter, 
“What Can We Hope For? An Exploration in Cosmopolitan Philosoph-
ical Anthropology.” The text is structured around two parts in which 
Mat tingly and Jensen fi rst discuss how collaboration between anthro-
pologists and philosophers may develop and enhance both if it rests on 
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a mutual recognition of the insights of each discipline. The authors note 
that both disciplines seem to keep a distance to each other. But instead 
of lamenting the lack of collaboration in spite of the many shared in-
terest in subject matter, they propose a way of initiating the conversa-
tion between anthropology and philosophy that begins in philosophy, 
but should be equally important for anthropology. Firstly, going back 
to Aristotle, they point out how philosophy, in order to philosophize 
about the world, needs to go beyond itself and look to other disciplines 
that produce valuable knowledge. Secondly, they invoke Sartre, who 
emphasized that philosophizing in the armchair and doing exegesis of 
texts is not enough if one really wants to philosophize about important 
matters. One needs to pay attention to the social practices themselves, 
and one must also be changed personally by the practice of philoso-
phizing. In other words, the development of social theory—whether it 
be philosophical or anthropological—demands engagement with social 
world practices. Learning and understanding the “real” social world 
en tails a change of personality in the sense of a change of perspective 
and a deepening of one’s understanding that does not leave everything 
as it was. Jensen and Mattingly thirdly argue that recapturing the dis-
tinction between “exegetical” and “cosmopolitan” forms of philosophy, 
the distinction which Kant drew, makes it possible to retain a space 
for the important practice of exegesis within philosophy without dis-
crediting one’s involvement in theorizing about worldly affairs. The 
philosophical anthropology of Kant is devoted to investigating popular 
concepts used by ordinary language users, and, in this sense, it covers 
Kant’s idea of a cosmopolitan philosophy as well as the discipline of 
contemporary anthropology. Although neither Jensen nor Mattingly are 
prone to accept Kantian philosophy as methodologically contemporary, 
they argue that his idea of a cosmopolitan philosophical anthropology 
makes a convincing starting point for fruitful encounters between the 
modern disciplines of anthropology and philosophy.
The second part of the joint chapter is an exposition of how a cos-
mopolitan philosophical anthropology might look. Focusing on the eth-
nographic material from the fi eldwork done by Mattingly and her group 
in Los Angeles among African-American families caring for children 
with severe medical conditions, the authors develop a study of hope. 
The concept of hope concerns future time in the subjunctive mode, 
and it can only be understood by taking the fi rst-person perspective of 
the person(s) hoping for the future. To study the concept of hope goes 
against one of the major trends in current anthropology and current 
philosophy, namely the structuralist and poststructuralist frameworks 
that downplay personhood. Jensen and Mattingly show—making a di-
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rect reference to Sartre’s claim that we ought not to employ theoretical 
positions without acknowledging how these theories develop as reac-
tions to other paradigms and positions—how this interest in hope inter-
sects with contemporary social theory. They develop a variant of virtue 
ethics rooted in Aristotle, but in employing it they stress that the per-
spective of hope only emerges if we look at the processes of acting and 
becoming as ends in themselves. Subsequently, the authors examine a 
concrete ethnographic instance of the process of becoming hopeful in 
spite of profound despair.
The dialogue Existential Anthropology and the Category of the New—
between anthropologist Michael D. Jackson, author of the chapter “The 
Reopening of the Gate of Effort: Existential Imperatives at the Margins 
of a Globalized World,” and philosopher Thomas S. Wentzer, author of 
the chapter “The Eternal Recurrence of the New”—explores the ques-
tion of an existential imperative concerning the desire to live a rich and 
fulfi lled life. Jackson, drawing upon the material from his fi eldwork in 
Kuranko villages in Northern Sierra Leone, focuses on the equivocality 
that pertains to our wishes for a better future. We address the powers 
that be both in the hope that some good will come of it and in the 
knowledge that our petitions will probably come to nothing. This real-
istic knowledge is attenuated under the conditions of life as it is lived 
by people on the margins of the globalized world, such as the Kuranko 
people. But it is, according to Jackson, an existential experience per-
taining to human life as such, since it concerns the distribution and 
redistribution of the scarcest of all goods: life itself. We aim for a life 
of well-being, but this is never a settled state. It is an ongoing struggle. 
Humans hardly ever feel completely satisfi ed with their lot, which is 
why they almost always strive to improve their situation socially, spir-
itually, or materially. This feeling of want, in proportion to what we 
think life ought to yield to us, is what Jackson calls “existential dissat-
isfaction” and it is an irreducible part of the human condition.
Jackson invokes two signifi cant episodes from his recent fi eldwork 
in Kuranko. First there is the letter from Ferenkay, a young Kuranko 
man from the village of Firawa, urging the recipient of the letter to take 
him along and give him a job and enable him to work. On the one hand 
this letter raises the ethical issue of why some people have so much 
more than others, and on the other hand it appeals to a conception of 
natural justice whereby all human beings are entitled to partake of the 
good things in life. Ferenkay appeals to “Mr. White Man” as a power 
mighty enough to be able to create a radical change and a new and bet-
ter beginning for his life. This letter, along with the second episode, a 
direct appeal that Jackson gets from another young man, Fasili, to take 
 Introduction 9
Fasili with him to America, depict very clearly the dilemma that Jack-
son, as a comparatively rich person, experiences when confronted with 
the existential demand from another person to assure him a fair deal, 
or some kind of natural justice. For how can one help the other in need 
without leaving oneself destitute? Fasili embodies the equivocality of 
the existential demand in his simultaneous patient stoicism toward the 
desperate conditions of his life, and his impatient and urgent desire for 
transformation of his situation. It is precisely this duality of hope toward 
the future that Wentzer’s contribution subjects to a conceptual analysis. 
Wentzer relates his philosophical analysis of the new to the concrete 
fi eldwork of Jackson.
Arguing for an existential understanding of the new, Wentzer under-
scores that the predicate “new” or the ontology of change concerns our 
emotive and conceptual stances toward our lives, which are brought 
into play while we cope with a changing world. According to Wentzer, 
we only articulate novelty if it comes across as the opening of an oppor-
tunity for us, while we resign and suffer the occurrences of the world 
whenever they work against us. To underline this existential attitude 
toward the new the ideal type attitudes of the stoicism of Seneca, and 
the historicism of Hegel are invoked. Thus Wentzer argues that the lan-
guage of the new is solely employed when we want to understand the 
future and our life as our own doing. Wentzer interprets the right to 
experience the event of a new beginning in one’s life as an existential 
demand in human life. This demand represents an imaginative door-
way to a new lifetime—we hope for a new beginning and thus hope for 
the possibility of doing things differently. It is therefore an optimistic 
hope to get a grip on one’s own life, felt from the fi rst-person perspec-
tive. This hope, however, may—if realized—turn out disappointing. It 
is not given that a new beginning—even such a radical one as Fasili 
dreams of by asking Jackson to bring him to America—will bring about 
a better life-situation. It may turn out to be another experience of sup-
pression and structural violence. According to Wentzer, the new should 
be understood as an attitude toward one’s future lifetime rather than an 
actual event. The new is real only as a mode of experiencing signifi cant 
possible change in life. It is, as such, an integral part of the human con-
dition as an intentional stance toward the occurrences in one’s life.
Wentzer and Jackson join forces to develop and explore the possibil-
ities of an existential anthropology that focuses on the common human 
condition and the shared wish to live in the world as if it were one’s 
own. The existential attitudes toward life and the narrating effort to un-
derstand life both as stoic fate and as possible new and better begin-
nings where we are subjects of our lives, instead of subjected to the 
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happenings of life, the authors argue, ought not to be reifi ed as different 
social formations or different forms of humanity.
Philosopher Esther Oluffa Pedersen and anthropologist Lotte Mein-
ert anchor their dialogue Intentional Trust in Uganda in a common 
interest in understanding the attitudes of trust and distrust as these are 
formed in, and of, the social sphere of human life. Through discussions 
during the writing process the two authors have taken mutual inspi-
ration from each other. Their chapters are the result of a coordination 
and cooperation between two independent lines of research. Peder sen’s 
chapter, entitled “An Outline of Interpersonal Trust and Distrust,” de-
velops a conceptual framework for understanding trust and distrust 
as attitudes that are highly sensitive to the social environment of the 
individual. Meinert’s chapter, “Tricky Trust: Distrust as a Point of De-
parture and Trust as a Social Achievement in Uganda,” is based on 
ethnographic fi eldwork carried out in Uganda primarily since 2008—
which was the year when “peace broke out,” as the Ugandans in the 
northern part of the country jokingly call the general peace treaty in 
Uganda. Pedersen and Meinert have worked at corroborating the the-
oretical model of trust suggested by Pedersen with the insights from 
the fi eldwork conducted by Meinert. As a result of the discussions they 
have developed a common understanding of both Pedersen’s theoret-
ical framework and Meinert’s interpretation of her own fi eldwork. In 
her theoretical conception of interpersonal trust, Pedersen strives to 
develop a framework within which both the individual experience of 
developments and changes in trust relationships between persons, and 
the general and more broad sociological atmosphere of trust or distrust 
between peers is taken into account. In order to achieve this goal she 
develops three main concepts. The fi rst concept is “prima facie trust/
distrust” by which Pedersen denotes the immediate way in which a 
person tends to meet social situations, trustfully or distrustfully, on the 
background of “things taken for granted” by that person. Important to 
Pedersen’s notion of prima facie trust/distrust is—in opposition to Knud 
E. Løgstrup—that it does not imply the assumption of an ontological or 
moral hierarchy between the attitudes of either trust or distrust. Rather, 
whether a person as a default attitude meets others with trust or dis-
trust depends on her past experience and social environment—brought 
up in an atmosphere of distrust between peers, distrust will also be-
come the prima facie attitude in encounters with others. Pedersen’s 
second main concept, “refl ective trust/distrust,” covers situations in 
which a person’s social world of “things-taken-for-granted” erodes and 
a decision about whether to act trustfully or distrustfully is required. 
Here, the situation and the comprehension hereof by the person experi-
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encing it will force a refl ective consideration of whether displaying trust 
or distrust toward others is appropriate. Thus in experiencing a breach 
in the expectancies the person is forced to refl ect over her placement of 
either trust or distrust in others and under certain circumstances. While 
the fi rst two concepts are meant to apply from a fi rst-person perspec-
tive, the third concept of Pedersen’s conceptual framework, the “locus 
of trust,” only applies from a third-person perspective and involves a 
description of the trust situation and the place of the trust relationship. 
This concept in particular has been developed through the discussions 
between Meinert and Pedersen. The idea is to try to capture the whole 
scene of trustful and distrustful interactions by schematizing features of 
each interacting individual with respect to questions about conventions 
of social action, institutions and social structure, collective worldviews, 
and ways of behaving toward nature and social entities. Thus, the lo-
cus of trust is “the interface of all participating agents’ individual trust 
diagrams in concrete time and place.”
Meinert opens her chapter by critically discussing the Danish theo-
logian K. E. Løgstrup’s assumption that trust is an ontologically (or 
naturally) founded and therefore basic attitude of human interaction, 
whereas distrust simply denotes a lack of trust. Meinert’s ethnographic 
fi eldwork in Uganda suggests, in contradiction to Løgstrup, that de-
veloping trust is a vulnerable and tricky human enterprise that may 
be preconditioned by distrust. In fi eldwork observations in Uganda, 
Meinert argues that the atmosphere of trust is permeated by distrust so 
that the human social world is, at the outset, taken to be untrustworthy. 
The trust in one another has no ontological status but is something we 
continually have to establish, to will into existence, and to fi ght for. 
During the period of 2008 to 2011, Meinert has conducted interviews 
with two young Ugandan men, Peter and Oloya, who were both, in 
different ways, victims of the long-lasting armed confl ict between the 
rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Ugandan government. In 
2008, after several years of unsuccessful peace negotiations, an agree-
ment to cease hostilities was fi nally signed between the confl icting par-
ties. At that time the confl ict had lasted for twenty-two years, and it left 
behind a Ugandan people who were deeply divided and beset with new 
uncertainties. This is the situation in which Meinert, in a local video 
shop, and over a period of three years, meets with Peter and Oloya, 
who both make music to express their state of uncertainty and despair, 
but also their hopes for a better future characterized by trust and truth-
fulness. In her interpretations and conclusions Meinert draws on the 
texts that accompany Peter’s and Oloya’s music, and also on their life 
stories as told to her by them, gradually revealing a deep rooted and all-
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embracing distrust. This fi nally leads Meinert to suggest that we cannot 
take trust to be the ontologically basic feature of inter-human relations 
as suggested in Løgstrup’s theory of trust.
As for the dialogue between the two chapters, Pedersen incorpo-
rates Meinert’s cases as striking examples that illustrate the difference 
between the levels of prima facie and refl ective trust/distrust. Likewise, 
Meinert applies the conceptual framework of Pedersen’s chapter in or-
der to grasp the differences between, on the one hand, the prima facie 
distrust that characterize the two young men and, on the other hand, 
their quest for a better future, which comes to the fore in their music. 
In their music, the young men refl ectively strive after developing trust. 
This Meinert views as an example of Pedersen’s differentiation between 
a prima facie attitude of distrust and a refl ective strive to build up trust-
ing attitudes toward others.
Whereas Meinert’s fi eldwork in Uganda draws attention to a so-
cial environment where distrust is predominant, anthropologist Nils 
Bubandt’s fi eldwork in Indonesia points to another complicated fea-
ture of trust relationships, namely the interconnections between trust, 
inauthenticity, and power. In the dialogue Trust, Ambiguity, and Indo-
nesian Modernity, Bubandt and philosopher Sune Liisberg explore the 
question whether inauthenticity and self-deception may be contained 
within trusting relationships. The cooperation in this dialogue consists 
of complementary investigations based on Bubandt’s analyses of fi eld-
work material from Indonesia and Liisberg’s philosophical analyses of 
the relation between trusting behavior and tolerance of ambiguity. Even 
though their chapters do not draw common conclusions, the shared 
effort to take the endeavor of the other into account opens the perspec-
tives of anthropologists and philosophers to complementary readings. 
Throughout their chapters, Bubandt and Liisberg make meta-commen-
taries to each other that are meant to invite the reader also to engage 
in such meta-discussions of fruitful pathways between anthropology 
and philosophy. It is made clear that Liisberg’s interpretation of trust as 
linked to tolerance of ambiguity through a benign form of self-decep-
tion and Bubandt’s discussion of the complex intertwinement between 
trust, authenticity, inauthenticity, power, and forgery in Indonesia may 
be read together in a manner that enhances both.
In his chapter, “Trust in an Age of Inauthenticity: Power and In-
donesian Modernity,” Bubandt presents his fi eldwork from Indonesia 
as what he calls a “counter-ethnography,” which serves to point out 
that the accustomed Western story of universal structures of trust and 
authenticity in modernity are far more complex. Bubandt endorses an 
idea of multiple modernities to elucidate the circumstances pertaining 
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to Indonesian understandings of power and authenticity. The aporia of 
Indonesian conceptions of power, trust, and novelty is that the new is 
politically claimed to be authentic by virtue of power, but that power 
is inherently inauthentic. Bubandt illustrates his assumption by discus-
sions of, fi rstly, the theme park Taman Mini Indonesia Indah, where 
the political power of the “New Order” of president Suharto installed 
itself as the authentic source of interpretation—and construction—of 
Indonesian culture. Secondly, Bubandt invokes the example of forg-
ery to discuss the role played by aspal, or “authentic-fake,” products 
in Indonesian ordinary, fi scal, and political life. Bubandt accounts for 
the lethal role played by a fake letter in the riots and unrest between 
Muslims and Christians in North Maluku in 2001. The letter, although 
suspected of being a forgery, still had a social effect. It reverses the 
logic of the “authentic-fake” state; a state that bestows authenticity 
upon objects simply by fi at and through its actual power. As a result, in 
Indonesia one can trust the givenness of power even while, at the same 
time, claims as to the authenticity of power and its authoritative signs 
are entirely untrustworthy.
Liisberg, in his chapter, “Trust as the Life Magic of Self-Deception: 
A Philosophical-Psychological Investigation into Tolerance of Ambigu-
ity,” embarks on a methodologically very different route by conferring 
his energy into an interpretation of Jean-Paul Sartre as a philosopher 
of trust. Liisberg shows how Sartre’s concepts of good and bad faith 
equally are instances of self-deception. Within the core of trustfulness 
there lies a certain type of self-deception in the form of good faith. It 
concerns a positive illusion about the other, which is needed to be 
able to trust in spite of an uncertainty, at least principal, about the 
intentions of the other—as they are merely probable—and about the 
future. This positive illusion can, according to Liisberg, be understood 
as a way of tolerating ambiguity. Since the happenings of the world are 
never known beforehand, the future is exposed to uncertainty. Trusting 
others in good faith is consequently something we can do when the 
ambiguities of the world stay on the fringes of our consciousness, while 
distrusting behavior potentially arises from an acute awareness of these 
ambiguities. The recourse to self-deception as bad faith is an attempt 
to overcome the meta-stable structure of human existence, namely the 
way our existence is stretched out between a facticity and a transcen-
dence of the given. In bad faith we either reify our transcendence by 
identifying with our facticity in a role—Sartre’s famous example being 
the waiter, who believes himself to be essentially a waiter in an at-
tempt to escape his inevitable freedom—or we endeavor to understand 
ourselves as pure consciousness or pure transcendence—where Sartre 
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offers the example of a woman who denies the fact that she is on an ob-
viously romantic date with a man by insisting that the man is entirely 
interested in having an intellectual conversation with her. The essential 
point that Liisberg makes is that we ought to employ the differentiation 
between good and bad faith not as a differentiation between authen-
tic and inauthentic beliefs, but rather between self-deceptive ways in 
which we try to cope with the inherent ambiguities of life, whereby 
trust can be interpreted as a certain benign form of self-deception based 
on positive ideas about the other.
Bubandt and Liisberg fi nd throughout their meta-discussions of 
the work of the other fruitful ways of including the concepts and phe-
nomena of each other. Different from such a model of cooperation, the 
dialogue between philosopher Sverre Raffnsøe and anthropologist Hiro-
kazu Miyazaki is molded as Miyazaki’s response to Raffnsøe’s concepts 
and ideas. As the title, Gift-Giving and Power Between Trust and Hope, 
suggests, Raffnsøe and Miyazaki investigate the relations between trust 
and hope through the lens of gift-giving and the social power it entails. 
Miyazaki’s contribution, “Hope in the Gift—Hope in Sleep” is partly 
based on ethnographical fi eldwork done in Fiji. It takes the form of a 
comment to Raffnsøe’s chapter, “Empowering Trust in the New: Trust 
and Power as Capacities.” Raffnsøe’s aim is to develop a new concep-
tion of power—which he calls “Power II”—a conception that enables 
us to consider trust as something which involves power, and vice versa, 
especially in the context of management. Without power there can be 
no management. The question is, however, whether the classical un-
derstanding of power, which consist in an “either–or” model—either 
you are in power and do not trust, or you trust at the price of having 
power—can serve as a model in a time like ours, where management 
tends to become management of self-management. Raffnsøe’s sugges-
tion is that management needs to adopt an idea of “both–and,” since 
in practical terms management needs both power and trust in order to 
function. If we want to place our “trust in trust” within management, 
we need to know how trust and power are internally compatible with 
each other. In opposition to the classical notion of power, which can 
also be defi ned by “the four Cs” (command, coercion, control, and 
calculation), the more refi ned concept of power that Raffnsøe presents 
is defi ned as a capacity to affect “the dispositions and the conduct” of 
others, which leads us to focus on the virtual. This means that we can 
conceive of trust as an anticipatory affect: Instead of calculating and 
controlling future scenarios by means of command and coercion, we 
rely on trust as the means to “conduct the conduct of others” by affect-
ing their dispositions through the trust we place in them. Against this 
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backdrop, trust becomes associated with hope and is turned toward 
the new as a form of negotiating the future, that is, as a form of the ex-
change of gifts, following Marcel Mauss’s model of primitive societies.
In his comment on Raffnsøe’s chapter, Miyazaki, on the basis of 
his fi eldwork among indigenous Fijians, focuses on the gift as a model 
of trust. Gift-givers place trust in gift-receivers, and this is anchored 
in hope, namely the hope for the effi cacy of the gift. Furthermore, to 
the Fijians the exchange of gifts is a means to obviate uncertainty, un-
knowability, and indeterminacy, which in addition generates hope for 
God’s mercy—the gift of eternal life—and obviates the unknowability 
of the effi cacy of the gift-giving itself. Thus, hope is allowed anew as a 
motivator of trust. As an alternative to understanding trust in terms of 
interaction, Miyazaki suggests the model of sleep as a non-interactional 
and non-relational model for comprehending the way trust and hope 
are constantly being made anew as capacities. If it is true that the gift 
is continual work, then sleep is an appropriate supplement to the gift. 
These considerations fi nally serve as a backdrop for Miyazaki’s refl ec-
tions upon the crisis of trust in Fukushima, which followed the earth-
quake, tsunami, and nuclear disasters that hit Japan in March 2011. As 
the Japanese government launched a campaign of kizuna (bonds) to 
unite forces throughout the nation to relieve the victims of the disas-
ters, it was expecting a form of reciprocal trust, i.e. gift-giving between 
the government and the citizens. Miyazaki’s analysis is concerned with 
the managerial motives of the “kizuna campaign” and the question 
why the campaign failed and instead engendered a sense of distrust in 
the government.
The dialogue With Kierkegaard in Africa is dedicated to a double 
investigation into hope as an existential structure in human life. Philos-
opher Anders Moe Rasmussen and anthropologist Hans Lucht take as 
their common starting point the perspective of the Danish philosopher 
Søren Kierkegaard, and more specifi cally his book Fear and Trembling 
from 1843. Though Kierkegaard functions as a shared theoretical frame-
work, Rasmussen and Lucht differ in the employment and analysis of 
Kierkegaard. Rasmussen is concerned with an interpretative elucida-
tion of the existential structure of hope in Kierkegaard’s text, whereas 
Lucht can be said to unfold the meaning of this structure in lived expe-
rience by invoking it in his analysis of fi eldwork material. In this sense 
their chapters complement each other as two different types of readings 
of Kierkegaard and of the existential experience of hope. Thereby they 
also enhance the scope of Kierkegaard’s philosophy.
Rasmussen opens his chapter, “Self, Hope, and the Unconditional: 
Kierkegaard on Faith and Hope,” by noticing how a discourse of hope 
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seems to have regained standing in our political and social life—a no-
table example of this tendency being the 2008 Obama campaign in 
the United States. The concept of hope has traditional roots in reli-
gious discourse, where it denotes the hope of an afterlife. The mod-
ern condition, however, is one of secularization and breaking away 
from tradition. Therefore it becomes acutely relevant to ask whether 
the notion of hope is possible to keep up without any connotations of 
something that transcends, and hence is “not of this world.” According 
to Rasmussen, Kierkegaard is a most interesting witness to this ques-
tion because he vividly invokes the two pitfalls in modernity, namely 
nihilism and orthodox religiosity/traditionalism. Confronted with the 
nihilistic nightmare that life is completely devoid of meaning, religious 
orthodoxy offers no remedy. Until Kierkegaard arrived on the scene, re-
ligious thought had managed to keep the nihilistic danger at a distance. 
But that path is no option for Kierkegaard. Instead, he attaches new 
meaning to the concepts of faith and hope, making them responsive to 
nihilism and turned against religious orthodoxy. Understood as a “par-
adox of existence,” faith is inscribed with a notion of distance or tran-
scendence. This feature of faith Kierkegaard elucidates through what 
he calls the double movement of faith. The double movement consists 
in, fi rstly, a transcendence of the fi nite and thus a grasp of the infi nite 
in the ethical stance. However, this infi nite ethical security has to be 
transcended by the second movement leading to a return to the fi nite 
on the strength of the absurd. This double movement underscores that 
faith and hope are to be understood in terms of self-relation, or anthro-
pologically. They denote the possibility of a radical change of attitude 
toward life as a whole; a change that accepts fi nitude only against the 
backdrop of the possible. Kierkegaard’s concept of hope is therefore an 
embracement of transitory reality as the place where something radi-
cally new can happen.
In the chapter “Kierkegaard in West Africa: Hope and Sacrifi ce in 
a Ghanaian Fishing Village,” Lucht employs the structure of hope as 
defi ned by Kierkegaard in the double movement of resigning every-
thing and winning it back “on the strength of the absurd,” using it 
to elucidate the rationale behind anthropomorphisms. Responding by 
anthropomorphizing the world that one has been thrown into involves 
a re-fi guration of that world to encompass moral concerns, so that the 
world can be trusted to respond to one’s yearnings and demands. Ac-
cordingly, human existence is based on the anguish involved in giving 
up everything to powers beyond one’s control in order to institute a 
moral structure on the indifferent outside world. Lucht interprets the 
struggles of Ghanaian fi shermen in accordance with this structure of 
 Introduction 17
hoping that the outside world will react responsively to their sacrifi ces. 
The canoe fi shermen offer the sea not only the sacrifi ce of a bull, but 
also their unmitigated practical involvement in fi shing, and they expect 
to get something in return from the sea’s understanding that it is obliged 
to give them something back. In this sense, the traditional fi shermen 
regard their toil with the sea and the fi sh as imbued with moral claims. 
However, the decline in canoe fi shing in the coastal villages of Ghana 
compromises this worldview. Without any reason to believe that the 
sea, by yielding a catch, will restore the engagement of the fi shermen, 
they fall into despair. The hopeless situation leaves many in a state of 
nihilism. One fi sherman expresses this to the anthropologist as follows: 
“Come back in ten years, and you’ll fi nd nothing here.” As an alterna-
tive, the hope of a better life in Europe spurs many to attempt high-risk 
immigration to Europe. The wave of African immigrants may be under-
stood as gift-giving and sacrifi ce in a shape that poses a potential threat 
to the political systems of Europe, in the sense that willingness to give 
up everything may disturb that power structure because it cannot be 
reciprocated. If power is based on some kind of reciprocity, the under-
lying power structure cannot be upheld when gifts given to it consist 
in utter self-sacrifi ce. But Lucht remarks that for this to be the case, 
the risks taken by African immigrants would have to be interpreted as 
sacrifi ces, and this is far from the case. Rather, in Europe migrant sto-
ries are conveyed through a fi lter of distance that takes the deaths and 
the suffering of migrants crossing the Mediterranean sea out of their 
moral contexts and inscribes them in the happenings of the unrespon-
sive world; a world to which Europeans seem to have no obligation.
Finally, in their epilogue “Anthropology and Philosophy in Dia-
logue?” anthropologist Anne Line Dalsgård and philosopher Søren Har-
now Klausen discuss some of the complexities involved in the dialogue 
between philosophers and anthropologists, which both disciplines have 
only recently embarked upon, for instance in the present volume and a 
few other initiatives. Their chapter is therefore a meta-refl ection upon, 
on the one hand, the biased presumptions of the two disciplines toward 
one another, and, on the other hand and in spite of these presumptions, 
the motivating factors in commencing such interdisciplinary engage-
ment between philosophy and anthropology. Over the last two decades, 
philosophers have increasingly been fi nding that they ought to relate 
to, and maybe even integrate, empirical fi ndings into their conceptu-
ally orientated work; in this respect, the philosopher’s most obvious 
choice for an empirical research fi eld has normally been the cognitive 
sciences. However, Klausen and Dalsgård argue, there are shortcomings 
linked with this combination, since most of the empirical fi ndings in the 
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cognitive sciences have been the result of experimental, and so more or 
less de-contextualized, research settings. Here anthropology, based on 
ethnographical fi eldwork, offers a quite different sort of research mate-
rial for philosophers to dialogue with—if they dare—namely real-life re-
search fi ndings concerned with a salient topic, specifi cally the question: 
“What are human beings?” This question is also very central in philoso-
phy, only in philosophy it is mostly posed in a generalizing form aiming 
at the essence of what the human being is. This difference therefore, 
and by the same token, invokes a classical example of how and where 
the two disciplines typically get into trouble when they confront each 
other, at least in the form of biases: On one side, anthropology, there is 
an emphasis on particular, contextualized points of view; on the other 
side, philosophy, there is an ambition of generalizing points of views 
into, ideally, an argument for one point of view. Nevertheless, anthro-
pologists have always found inspiration in philosophy, and there are 
also examples of philosophers owing their inspiration to anthropology, 
one notable instance being the theoretical debt that French poststruc-
turalism owes to structural anthropology. The ideal that Klausen and 
Dalsgård ultimately envision for the dialogue between anthropology 
and philosophy is that “philosophy could be prompted by the fi ndings 
of anthropology to ask new questions, which would then be subjected 
to fi eldwork by anthropologists.”
The present book is no ordinary anthology. It is a workroom in 
which anthropologists and philosophers have commenced on a dia-
logue on the two research topics, trust and hope, that are important 
for the fi eld of anthropology as well as for the fi eld of philosophy. The 
interdisciplinary efforts of the contributors demonstrate how the com-
ing together of anthropologists and philosophers can result in new and 
challenging ways of thinking about trust and hope. We hope this en-
deavor of starting a closer dialogue between anthropology and philoso-
phy will be a source of inspiration for others to work in the productive 
intersection between anthropology and philosophy and to investigate 
further into the social phenomena of trust and hope.
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